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The United States has been singularly unsuccessful at
controlling health care spending. During the past four
decades, American policymakers and analysts have
embraced an ever changing array of panaceas to control
costs, including managed care, consumer-directed
health care, and most recently, delivery system reform
and value-based purchasing. Past panaceas have gone
through a cycle of excessive hope followed by disappoint-
ment at their failure to rein in medical care spending. We
argue that accountable care organizations, medical
homes, and similar ideas in vogue today could repeat
this pattern. We explain why the United States persis-
tently pursues health policy fads—despite their poor
record—and how the promotion of panaceas obscures
critical debate about controlling health care costs.
Americans spend too much time on the quest for the
“holy grail”—a reform that will decisively curtail spending
while simultaneously improving quality of care—and too
little time learning from the experiences of others.
Reliable cost control does not, contrary to conventional
wisdom, require fundamental delivery system reform or
an end to fee-for-service payment. It does require the U.
S. to emulate the lessons of other nations that have been
more successful at limiting spending through budgeting,
systemwide fee schedules, and concentrated purchasing.
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T he United States has the most expensive medical caresystem in the world by a large margin, with per capita
expenditures of $7960 in 2009.1 Moreover, despite a recent
slowdown due largely to the recession’s impact, the U.S. is
projected to spend over $30 trillion on medical care in the
coming decade.2 Over four decades after President Richard
Nixon declared a cost crisis, the United States has yet to get
a firm grip on rising medical care costs.
The failure to control health care spending has been
accompanied by a distinctive dynamic. Since the 1970s,
American policymakers and policy analysts have relentlessly
searched for the “the Big Fix,”3 a reform that will decisively
rein in spending and simultaneously improve the coordination
and quality of medical care. The combination of these
ambitious goals and our dismal record of cost containment
has not diminished the health policy community’s endless
enthusiasm for the latest fad. We have run through a truly
staggering list of proposed panaceas: Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPOs), managed care, capitation, integrated delivery systems,
health savings accounts (HSAs) and consumer-directed care,
pay for performance (P4P), health information technology
(HIT), comparative effectiveness research (CER) and much
more. Now, bundled payment, value-based purchasing,
patient-centered medical homes, and accountable care organ-
izations (ACOs) have emerged as the solutions of the day,
propelled forward by the 2010 Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) and by private sector initiatives.
Reforms aimed at slowing health care spending have
encompassed (and often combined) a range of organiza-
tional (HMOs, ACOs), financial (bundling, HSAs, P4P,
ACOs), and informational (HIT, CER) approaches. Some
reforms have called for more patient cost-sharing, others for
tighter control of medical services by health plans, and still
others for more evidence to guide medical decision-making.
Thus the U.S. has moved rhetorically from the era of
managed care to consumer-directed health care and now
into the era of value purchasing and delivery system reform.
The range of available ideas is evidently narrow enough that
we are now repeating fads—yesterday’s conviction that
capitation held the key to stemming the tide of rising costs
is reborn in today’s faith in bundling while integrated
delivery systems and HMOs have morphed into ACOs.4
THE SEARCH FOR THE HOLY GRAIL
Fads in American health policy come and go so quickly that
there is too little reflection about their origins, effects, and
whether any are actually effective approaches to controlling
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health care spending. Why do American analysts keep
searching for the Holy Grail in health policy and what
impact has that quest had on our medical care? American
health policy is dominated by the search for these policies
largely because of their political appeal. Reform labels
promise to modernize and rationalize the health care system.
Who can oppose the march of progress to replace paper
medical records or our ostensibly antiquated fee-for-service
payment arrangements? How can anyone oppose reforms
that promise to curb medical spending and yet improve
health outcomes? Indeed, because panaceas promise to
moderate spending by reducing ineffective care, improving
coordination, and keeping people healthy, such policies offer
the prospect of painless cost control.5
That is powerfully alluring for politicians who want to
avoid the conflict associated with policies such as imposing
budgetary caps, limiting payments, restricting the availability
of services, or cutting benefits. Further, if new organizations
can be created to handle the task of making the difficult
choices, or if new payment tools can be adopted that
automatically unleash the right incentives, politicians can
avoid blame for unpopular decisions. Innovation and its
promise to enhance efficiency is an appealing substitute for
policy realism and political will.
Many of these reform ideas are framed in ways that
makes rational criticism seem implausible. Few will defend
“medical homelessness” or argue that the U.S. medical care
system needs less coordinated care. Indeed, a key charac-
teristic of many reforms is that their descriptive labels are
not actually descriptive, but instead comprise persuasive
definitions.6 We used to label health care organizations by
their primary characteristics; Kaiser Permanente was accu-
rately known as a “prepaid group practice.” But beginning
with the Nixon administration’s campaign to promote
Health Maintenance Organizations in the 1970s, policy-
makers and analysts increasingly started to label organiza-
tions and policies more by their aspirations, rather than by
their substantive characteristics. “Managed care” and
“patient-centered medical homes” exemplify such market-
ing slogans, terms that imply success by their very use. Yet
many so-called managed care plans actually don’t do much
to manage care.7 And whether a health care institution is
“patient centered” is an empirical question (assuming we
could agree on a definition of what it means to be patient-
centered). In other words, the language used to describe
many health reforms is meant to convince rather than to
describe and explain, and that obscures realistic assessments
of their appeal and impact.
Another reason that Americans look for the “big fix” is the
absence of a coherent national health system. In most
industrialized democracies, health care spending is controlled
“upstream” through budgeting, fee schedules, and systemwide
limits on medical capacity. But adopting such measures in the
U.S. political system has been and remains extraordinarily
difficult. Restraining spending requires reducing the income
of health care providers who historically have been effective
at resisting robust cost controls.8 In addition, government
measures to reduce spending growth invite charges of
rationing that tap into many Americans’ distrust of govern-
ment—recall the hysteria over mythical “death panels” during
the 2009-2010 health care reform debate. And America’s
fragmented political institutions give opponents multiple
chances to defeat or weaken proposals to limit spending.
In fact, the U.S. has not had a national health system at
all and consequently, cost containment efforts often focus
“downstream” to regulate the costs of individual medical
encounters.9 These efforts are typically led by individual
employers and health plans, actors that by definition cannot
pursue systemwide solutions. Our enthusiasm for innova-
tive and organizational solutions to cost containment is,
then, partly a product of our political incapacity to produce
universal health insurance. Belief in “American exception-
alism”—that as a nation we are too different culturally,
socially, and politically to learn from other countries—has
reinforced America’s tendency to look inward for solutions
to control health care spending.
Problems with Panaceas
There are five major problems with the endless search for
cost control panaceas. The first is that the yearning for a
transcendent solution inevitably produces a cycle of
exaggerated expectations, followed by deep disappoint-
ment. The problem, as Bruce Vladeck argues, begins when
a “modestly successful innovation is hyped as the unique
and unitary solution to some complex, persistent problem.”10
Thus many policy analysts celebrated the rise of managed
care during the early to mid-1990s as the solution to
America’s health care spending problem. But as health care
costs started to accelerate again, analysts quickly turned to
writing managed care’s obituary.
Similarly, it will be difficult for ACOs to meet the lofty
expectations that now surround them. ACO euphoria is
evident in Ezekiel Emanuel and Jeffrey Liebman’s foolhar-
dy prediction that “By 2020, the American health insurance
industry will be extinct,” replaced entirely by ACOs.11
Given the hype about their transformational impact, it is
worth remembering the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) median estimate that the ACO Shared
Savings Program will reduce federal government spending
on Medicare by only a total of $470 million during 2012-
15, a tiny fraction of total program expenditures.12
Moreover, a recent review by the Congressional Budget
Office of disease management, care coordination, and
value-based payment demonstrations—all ideas currently
touted as solutions to Medicare’s financing challenges—
found that “most programs have not reduced Medicare
spending.”13
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Second, because we invest so much hope and faith in
new solutions, and because persuasive labels make these
ideas appear self-evidently right, the real-world challenges
in making policies work are commonly overlooked.
Aspirations are undercut by implementation problems,
unanticipated outcomes and political constraints. Managed
care triggered backlash from providers and patients.
Supposedly the least effective form of managed care—
PPOs—surprisingly emerged as the victor in the market by
the beginning of the 2000s.14 ACOs may enhance integra-
tion of some providers and foster better coordination of
some care. But the incentives to create ACOs may also lead
to greater consolidation of health care providers and to
hospitals purchasing physician practices, both of which
could raise overall health spending.15
A third problem is generalizability. The enthusiasm for
particular reforms often stems from positive results in a
particular geographic and institutional settings: Kaiser
Permanente, the Palo Alto clinic and the Mayo Clinic were
held up as exemplars in the past, today they are joined by
the Veterans Administration, Geisenger, and Intermountain.
These institutions have in many cases produced impressive
results. But the success of any particular institution does not
imply that its performance can be extrapolated to the whole
of American medicine. The difficulties Kasier has had in
making its model work outside of its traditional regions
illustrates this point.16 And the VA has a level of
organizational centralization that is not found in most other
areas of American medicine. Creating new types of
organizations is extraordinarily difficult and replicating
them across different institutional, political, economic and
geographic settings is even more so.17
A fourth problem is that these reform ideas usually focus
on reducing the utilization of medical services. There are, to
be sure, many instances of low-value medical care in the U.
S. worth reducing.18,19 And in the past decade, increases in
Medicare expenditures on physician services have been
driven mostly by growth in service volume and intensity.20
But a predominant focus on utilization diverts us from other
important sources of high health care spending.21–23 The
difference between Canadian and American spending on
hospital and physician care, according to a recent study, is
mostly explained by prices and administrative expenses,
reflecting the lower costs of Canada’s single-payer system.24
Only 14% of the difference is attributable to higher
utilization of medical services in the U.S. Yet American
policy analysts continue to focus on ways to limit excessive
utilization, while giving comparatively short shrift to
policies—such as all-payer reform—that could lower
prices and administrative costs.
The final and most serious problem is that the American
quest for cost control fads hasn’t worked—which helps
explain why the U.S. keeps searching for more panaceas.
Medical care spending did slow for a time during the
managed care era but, emblematic of the issues described
above, much of that slowdown was attributable to price
restraints.25 Still, the overall record of health care cost
control in the U.S. is dismal. That doesn’t mean that the
latest fad of delivery system reform is a bad thing. Perhaps
these and other reform ideas currently in vogue will
produce some savings. But even if they don’t reduce
spending, reforms that encourage ACOs and medical homes
will be worthwhile if they improve the delivery and quality
of care, and patient outcomes. Cost savings should not be
the only metric by which we judge the desirability of health
care reforms.
Emulation, Not Innovation
We do not know how far ACOs will spread or what
impact they, medical homes or other delivery system
reforms will have on health care spending. But our history
of failed cost control offers sobering lessons about
exaggerated expectations, the limits of organizational
reforms, and the recurring temptation to oversell reform
ideas like ACOs as panaceas and the harbingers of a new,
radically transformed, and vastly improved health care
system. Such ideas should be seen as supplements, rather
than the basis for a national strategy of health care cost
control.
We believe that the U.S. needs less innovation and more
emulation.26 That is, in order to control costs effectively
Americans should focus less on (re)inventing the latest
delivery system or payment method, and instead pay more
attention to what other countries do to slow health care
spending.27 Global budgets, fee schedules, systemwide
payment rules, and concentrated purchasing power may
not be modern, exciting or “transformational”. But they
have the advantage of working.
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